had another little brother. My cousin came and told me they held him and cut his throat with a knife, but he did not die.
I went to the Northwest to find a boat to go to Miami. Finding a boat wasn't hard, but I did have to borrow the $1,500 for passage. I sold one of my small plots to a local gros negre 4 who buys from anyone needing money to go to Miami. The price wasn't too good and we had the land in the family since the time of Dessalines, but I couldn't stay in the mountains forever. Anyway, I thought, once in Miami I could earn enough to buy it back and probably even some more. Other families in the village received as much as $200 a month from relatives in Miami. That's more than most could earn in three years.
The boat left Haiti at the end of August 1978. In the beginning there were 145 of us crammed into a twenty foot, leaky, wooden sailboat. Not everyone could even sit down at the same time.
Their destination was 720 miles away, but Jean had little idea how long it would take to get there. The captain said it would depend on the winds and luck. They apparently had little of either. They ran out of water first, and then food. Many tried to drink the sea water, but it made Jean sick; he preferred to go thirsty. They began to die, and after two weeks there were barely more than 100 still alive. Although Jean did not know it, they had gone about 600 miles and were still 120 miles south of Miami.
One evening a U.S. Coast Guard cutter approached them. Jean and the others felt joy and relief. "We're saved," he thought. Jean, along with everyone else, crowded on the side of the boat closest to the cutter. Some began jumping into the water and swimming towards the cutter. The sailboat tilted and then capsized. Jean did not know how to swim and he thrashed around in panic. Three drowned before the Coast Guard saved the rest.
When they arrived in Miami, they were greeted by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities, who transported them to an INS processing center. The center was already filled with other Haitians awaiting the U.S. Government's decision whether to allow them to stay in the United States or to return them to Haiti.
Through an interpreter, Jean told an INS official his story of the bicycle, the Macoute, and why he left Haiti. The INS officer said that Jean did not qualify for political asylum, that he was coming to the United States to work, that he left Haiti because of a personal dispute, and that if he stayed in the United States he would remain in jail. The INS officer told Jean that he could fly back to Haiti for free if he would just sign a piece of paper. Jean knew that others had signed the paper and disappeared, and he knew he did not want to go back to Haiti, where he believed he would meet certain death. Besides, some of the others in the camp said there was still a chance they could be released.
Jean's dilemma mirrors the plight of these refugees under current American policy perspectives. The Government contends that, while a few of the Haitians deserve asylum, the vast majority are economic-not political-refugees. They are not fleeing political persecution, but are attracted to the vastly superior economic opportunities in the United States. As such, they do not have a legitimate legal claim to remain in the United States. However, if they were fleeing political perse- The answers to these questions turn on the definition, as established by international and U.S. law, of refugees, their rights, U.S. obligations toward them, and conditions in their homelands. A review of these topics indicates that there is some truth to both sides of the argument; Haitians are both economic and political refugees. The conceptual framework embodied in international and U.S. law does not adequately categorize individuals fleeing a regime which exacerbates poverty and exploits the common man while efficiently and viciously repressing the slightest real or imagined criticism. Foreign policy concerns about other Third World migrants lead the U.S. Government to emphasize the boat people's economic motivations. On the other hand, humanitarian considerations and concern for human rights and economic development in Haiti lead Haitian advocates to emphasize the political motivations of the boat peoples' departures, especially the likelihood of persecution if they are returned.
II THE LAW
An examination of the definition and rights of the refugee within international and U.S. law reveals ambiguities which have allowed the United States to con-struct a refugee policy favoring those fleeing leftist totalitarian regimes, while discriminating against those fleeing rightist authoritarian regimes.
A. International Law
Persecution and flight from persecution have been with man as long as civilization has existed. Until this century, little attention was given, either in law or in sentiment, to the plight of refugees. However, the massive movements caused by this century's revolutions and wars, and the increasing interdependence of the world's economic and political systems have produced an awareness of the problems of refugees.
While Latin American law and some extradition treaties have recognized the peculiar status of refugees for some time, 7 it was not until after World War II that the developed countries and the international community in general began to construct mechanisms for controlling and alleviating the refugee crises.
8
In drafting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 9 some nations proposed a provision guaranteeing every individual a right to asylum, or "droit d'asylee." 1° The proposal was defeated, however, on the grounds that it contravened the fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty which gives a state the right to bar aliens from entry into that state. "
The debate illustrates a basic conflict of refugee policy in international law: Individuals have rights in their own countries; when those rights are abrogated, individuals have a "right" to flee and be protected from persecution, but states in which they may seek asylum also have the right to deny them entry. 12 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights skirted the issue by stating in its final text that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."' 3 The right to "enjoy asylum," however, was limited to the right of every state to offer refuge and to resist demands for extradition. 4 The issue was confronted more directly in the United Nations' 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which extended the protections adopted in the Convention to a broader group of aliens.' Article 1 of the UN Protocol provides the most widely accepted definition of a refugee: A refugee is a person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.' 16 Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the Convention further define the rights of refugees with respect to state sovereignty. 'Article 31 restrains states from imposing penalties on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence." 1 Article 32 prohibits states from expelling "a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order," and then "only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law;" and finally, "[t]he Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country."' 8 Article 33 articulates the principle of non-refoulement: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
19
The UN Convention and Protocol thus protect a refugee by prohibiting contracting states from expelling anyone to territories where he would be subject to persecution. The Protocol also maintains the principle of state sovereignty over immigration by not compelling states to accept refugees into their territories. These protections apply only to those immigrants who are indeed refugees, i.e., individuals who have a "well-founded fear of persecution." Neither the UN documents nor any other international instruments, however, provide a precise definition of a "well-founded fear of persecution."
The British have tended to define persecution rather narrowly. In one case, the British Immigration Appeals Tribunal stated that an individual prosecuted for breaching a country's law had not necessarily been persecuted even though the laws in question were clearly political. Those laws had imposed penalties for degrading or scoffing at the state, its system or its public organs, for extolling fascism, and for disseminating false information injurious to the state. 20 At the other extreme, it has been argued that persecution may include actions by the general public against religious, ethnic, or political groups which pose no immediate threat to life or limb but which may produce a state of mind making it 16 . Convention, supra note 15, at art. 1 (as amended by Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 1). intolerable to remain in that country. 21 Although no country has implemented law or policy quite so broad, some European countries did confront a similar situation in the mid-1960's when a growing number of persons from Eastern Europe fled to western European countries. The prevailing opinion in the recipient countries was that the majority of the refugees were fleeing both the generalized political repression and the relative economic deprivation of the Communist countries. In the recipient countries' interpretations, the refugees did not strictly fit the UN definition. Nevertheless, it was considered impolitic and inhumanitarian to return them, especially because the refugees argued that they could be persecuted upon returning simply for having fled. The Scandinavian countries, followed by the Netherlands, introduced the concept of "B-status refugee" in legal and administrative practice. B-status refugees were allowed to remain, yet were distinguished from those persons fleeing individualized persecution.
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The United States has not created such an intermediate status, but historically its practice has been to grant a blanket presumption of persecution to those fleeing Communist states, while maintaining a far stricter standard for those fleeing rightist authoritarian regimes. This dichotomous policy and the inherent tension between this policy and the general humanitarian principles of the UN Protocol is one of the underlying issues in the controversy involving the Haitian boat people.
B. U.S. Law and Policy Toward Refugees
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
The Statue of Liberty, bearing the quoted humanitarian words of welcome, was unveiled in 1886. Ironically, the unveiling came shortly after the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, America's first restrictive immigration law. 23 Since the Exclusion Act, American immigration has been highly selective: race and national origin were important criteria in the formulation of U.S. immigration policy, at least until the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952;24 with regard to refugees, foreign policy considerations have predominated. 25 The end of World War II and the emergence of the Cold War were the two major catalysts in the formation of U.S. and international refugee law. 26 At the end of the war the Allied armies found themselves guardians of 8,000,000 people, [Vol. 45: No. 2 including survivors of extermination camps, prisoners of war, forced laborers from states conquered by Germany, and thousands who fled before the advance of the Russian Army. Many of these people refused to return to their homes behind the Iron Curtain for fear of persecution. The British, French, and American Governments refused to accede to Soviet demands for forced repatriation.
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A series of ad hoc U.S. refugee programs followed. Most legislation commenced with broad humanitarian language offering protection to those who faced "persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinions." However, the applicability of such legislation was, in fact, generally limited to "freedom fighters" who were voting with their feet by fleeing communism. The INA included two provisions which were to become the primary mechanisms for admitting future refugee groups into the United States: (1) the withholding of an alien's deportation; 3 2 and (2) the administrative parole of aliens into the United States. 33 Which of these provisions would be utilized depended upon whether an alien had already entered the United States, legally or illegally, or whether he was applying for admission at the frontier.
Section 243(h) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien when, in the opinion of the Attorney General, the alien would be subject to physical persecution. 34 In 1965, the provision was amended by deleting the physical persecution requirement and replacing it with the phrase "persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion. ' 
proceedings.
3 7 Aliens apprehended before effecting entry, perhaps in territorial waters or at a port of entry, have their cases heard in exclusion proceedings for which section 243(h) claims are not allowed.
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The INA also authorizes the Attorney General, "in his discretion," to temporarily parole any alien into the country for "emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." '39 Although Congress envisioned this authority as applying in only limited circumstances and numbers, 40 more refugees have been admitted under the parole authority than by any other mechanism. 4 1 Because of the virtually continuous defections from Eastern Europe after the Hungarian revolt of 1956, the Attorney General began to rely extensively on the parole authority.
4 2 In 1965 Congress attempted to restrict the use of parole by adding a "seventh preference" for refugees who were defined as those fleeing Communist countries in the Eastern Hemisphere or certain countries of the Middle East. 43 Yet when the Cuban airlift program began the following year, the seventh preference proved to be too narrow still, for the Attorney General again invoked the parole authority for massive numbers of refugees.
44
In 1968 the United States became a signatory to the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
4 5 The Protocol included no bias in favor of those fleeing communism. To the contrary, the language clearly carried no ideological biases. Technically, the Protocol superseded U.S. refugee law and thus should have eliminated the bias in U.S. law. This did not prove to be the case, however. In the Senate hearings on the treaty, the executive branch testified that the Protocol resulted in no significant changes in U.S. laws, and no laws or regulations were implemented to carry out the new provisions. 
C. Asylum Provisions
The law pertaining to asylum was intended primarily for individuals applying for entry into the United States as refugees from abroad. Aside from section 243(h), which allowed the Attorney General to withhold deportation, little atten- 48 defined who could apply for asylum and the structure of adjudication. Applications for asylum were to be made to the INS District Director who could "approve or deny the application in the excercise of discretion. ' '49 The decision was to be made in writing, and was not subject to appeal, except that claims under the Protocol could be reinitiated at subsequent "expulsion hearings." 50 The Attorney General interpreted this exception to apply to deportable aliens only, and not those in exclusion proceedings. Those in deportation proceedings were to be advised of their legal rights, including the right to counsel at their own expense; those in exclusion proceedings did not have to be advised of their rights.
Asylum applicants presented their cases before the INS District Director, who determined whether the case was clearly meritorious, clearly lacking in substance, or doubtful. 52 If doubtful, an advisory opinion was to be solicited from the State Department.
53 If the asylum request were approved, the alien could be admitted either as a conditional entrant under the seventh preference or could be granted parole.
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While the regulations indicated which data were to be solicited from the applicant, no criteria were clearly established. The regulations referred both to the broad, humanitarian Protocol and to the narrow, ideological criteria of the seventh preference, but nowhere did they refer to a "well-founded fear of persecution."
Until the Haitian litigation of the late 1970's, 55 aliens in exclusion proceedings who were denied asylum requests had no right of appeal except through habeas corpus proceedings in the federal courts. 56 For those in deportation proceedings, negative decisions could be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals Withholding of deportation has been granted infrequently and primarily to those who have been members of dissident political groups, active political figures, or those who have been highly critical of their home government. 59 Historically, asylum has been granted to virtually everyone fleeing any Communist regime except Yugoslavia. 60 As a State Department official noted, "It's just agreed upon that, if they have fled from a Communist government, they are refugees. ' 6 '
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GENERAL POLICY FOR DEALING WITH REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM BY FOR
According to State Department and Immigration officials, it is relatively rare for aliens from Communist countries to be placed in deportation proceedings at all.
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They therefore seldom confront the need to request the section 243(h) relief of withholding deportation. Those fleeing friendly governments have had a much more difficult time obtaining asylum. State Department officials recognize that by granting refugees rights in the United States they imply a denial of rights in the refugees' home countries. "There is no question that, when we grant asylum to a refugee from a government . . . with which we are friendly, that government feels that its reputation is slighted, its honor impugned. This can only lead to resentment against the United States and both governments lose out." '63 Since World War II, leftist totalitarian countries have been unfriendly towards the United States, while most rightist authoritarian countries have been defined as friends. 64 For those who believe in such a dichotomy, totalitarian governments have no freedoms. In contrast, according to this argument, authoritarian governments have some freedoms. For example, in the House Subcommitee on Immigration hearing on Haitian refugees in 1980, Chairwoman Holtzman asked the State Department's human rights officer for Haiti if there was political freedom at all in Haiti. The only "gleam of light" he could cite was freedom of religion.
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By implication, all individuals fleeing totalitarian governments are ipso facto fleeing persecution. Those individuals and the countries friendly to the United States (opposing totalitarianism) deserve help. In contrast, also by implication, [Vol. 43: No. 2 authoritarian countries only persecute individuals who are "politically involved," i.e., participants in organized, institutionalized activities such as political parties. Any others fleeing authoritarian governments can only be escaping dire economic conditions. Individuals who may be attempting to avoid extortion by local officials are not fleeing persecution, but personal disputes.
Thus, admitting Haitians as refugees would set a precedent for "opening the floodgates" to immigrants from other authoritarian regimes. 66 The strategy of the executive branch, therefore, has been substantively to deny the Haitians access to the economic opportunities they are seeking, and ideologically to deny evidence that either blurs the political/economic cleavage or demonstrates that Haitian boat people have been or would be directly subject to persecution in Haiti.
This strategy is reflected in asylum statistics. For 1975 and 1976, the last two years for which asylum statistics are available, the United States granted asylum to 5% of those fleeing rightist regimes and 95% of those fleeing Communist countries.
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Congress explicitly designed the Refugee Act of 1980 to eliminate this biased and discriminatory treatment. 68 The Act essentially adopts the Protocol's refugee definition and conforms asylum and section 243(h) procedures to this definition. The Act also removes the discretionary language of section 243(h).
69 These changes establish a basis for transforming U.S. refugee and asylum policy from a simple tool of the Cold War into a means of implementing broader humanitarian principles.
At least in the admission of refugees from abroad, however, the practice has yet to match the principles. Fully 90% of the refugees who were admitted in 1980 and 1981 were from Indochina, the U.S.S.R., and Eastern Europe. 70 For those aliens within the United States requesting asylum, neither of the two largest groupsHaitians and El Salvadorans-have had any significant number of asylum applications approved. 7 In short, while U.S. asylum law has been increasingly based on broad humanitarian principles, the cold war legacy persists and continues to dominate policy implementation. International and U.S. domestic law define and protect the rights of those fleeing "persecution," but the lack of definitional precision for "persecution" has permitted U.S. officials to persist in defining those escaping Communist regimes as ipso facto fleeing "persecution." In contrast, in the eyes of U.S. Haitians have a long history of migration and temporary sojourns to other countries. For example, working-class Haitians have served as contract laborers harvesting sugarcane in the Dominican Republic for most of this century, while the children of Haiti's small middle and upper classes have traditionally attended schools in France. 73 Though political opponents of new Haitian presidents had always tended to leave Haiti after power changes, that migration had historically been confined to a small number of the elite. Since Francois Duvalier ("Papa Doc") assumed power in 1958, however, all levels of Haitian society have joined the exodus. 4 After Papa Doc's ascension to power, the first to leave were the upper class who directly threatened his regime.
7 5 Around 1964, in response to the brutality of the Duvalier regime and the lack of personal and economic security, the black middle class began to leave. 76 In the next wave, many of the urban lower classes departed. 77 The primary U.S. destination of these groups has been New York City, where it is estimated there are presently between 200,000 and 300,000 Haitians. 7 8 They form a heterogeneous group, reflecting all strata of Haitian society.
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While many are legal migrants, others are not; nevertheless, they are seldom pursued by the INS authorities in New York. 
B. Haitian Economic Conditions
No one denies Haiti's dismal economic conditions. It is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and the 28th poorest country in the world.
8 ' It also has one of the world's most inequitable distributions of income and wealth, with .8% of the population possessing 44.8% of the wealth. 82 The World Bank estimates that nearly 90% of the incomes are lower than the minimum necessary for survival.
8 3 Papa Doc's reign of terror, between 1958 and his death in 1971, produced a flight not only of people but also of capital,I which led to a decline in the gross national product throughout his reign.
8 4 The succession of Jean-Claude Duvalier ("Baby Doc"), in 1971, was hailed as marking an end to terror and a beginning of liberalization. Baby Doc himself has claimed that he is ushering in an economic revolution which will transform Haiti into a peaceful, stable society, progressing toward democracy, human rights, and material prosperity. Manufacturing activity has, in fact, greatly increased under Baby Doc's rule, especially in the assembly sector. 86 Having the Western Hemisphere's lowest wages and being in close proximity to the United States, Haiti offers an unparalleled opportunity for investors. Profits can be extraordinarily high-30% to 50% on equity-and capital per worker is very low-$700 to $3,500.87 Yet the effect of the increase in productivity on the masses has been negligible. Between 1960 and 1979, gross domestic product per capita growth was .9% annually.
8 Furthermore, income disparities between rural regions (which contain 75% to 90% of the population, depending upon the definition) and urban areas are increasing.
8 9 In this context, money remitted to Haiti by expatriates can be critical to a family's survival. It is estimated that Haitians abroad send back $100,000,000 each year in hard currency, 9° nearly as much as the combined total of Haiti's foreign aid. estimated that nearly 50% of the state's income ends up in private hands. 92 Duvalier controls a vast state monopoly, Regie de Tabac, which exercises exclusive control over distribution of necessities such as fish, cotton, all types of milk and milk products, as well as items such as wine, champagne, whiskey, rum, perfume, dental products, soap, bandages, air conditioners, autos, airplanes, and most electrical appliances. 93 In 1977 Regie de Tabac was estimated to have collected about $1,000,000, but only $580,000 reached the public treasury.
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Corruption aside, the government's policies are ill-designed to correct Haiti's problems of massive rural poverty. While 90% of the population is rural, 83% of government expenditures are in Port-au-Prince, the nation's capital, and agricultural expenditures never exceed 7% to 10% of the budget. 95 The tax structure is highly regressive, ignoring luxury imports and targeting the basic commodities produced and consumed by peasants. The variety of torture is incredible: clubbing to death, maiming the genitals, food deprivation to the point of starvation, and insertion of red-hot pokers into the back passage. In fact, these prisons are death traps and find a parallel with the Nazi concentration camps of the past but have no present-day equivalent. Recently, under oath in a U.S. federal district court, a former State Department desk officer for Haiti described the regime as the "most oppressive regime in the hemisphere." 98 In 1979, Baby Doc allowed the formation of political parties and then promptly arrested the leaders of one. 99 The government imposed censorship on the theater in order to close down a Creole-language play that was critical of the government.i l° In October 1979, a press law was passed that made it illegal to insult the "President for Life," his mother, or other government officials. ' Arbitrary arrest, abduction, prolonged detention, severe mistreatment of prisoners and harassment of ordinary citizens by government security forces are common occurrences. These practices continue virtually unchecked by the government. Little value is placed on the Rule of Law; practically nothing has been done to develop institutional structures through which these basic violations can be ended. A survey published by the weekly magazine Pett Samedi Soir in August 1979, revealed that 93% of the respondents felt insecure under the "liberalized" rule of JeanClaude Duvalier, and that over 80% feel that the country does not offer sufficient guarantees for the protection of human rights. Immediately following publication of this poll, the government arrested three people associated with the magazine. In some cases, simply having been abroad, regardless of one's activities within or outside of Haiti, has been sufficient to elicit persecution. and began to lose consciousness more and more frequently. On Thursday morning just before they entered our cells to beat us, I heard one of the guards say to the other, "Some of the people here are from Miami, and one is from the A former member of the infamous security forces, the Tonton Macoutes,°1 0 has been quoted as stating:
Publicly, Jean-Claude Duvalier said that people who are returned to Haiti . . . would be allowed to return to their homes without any problem. But . . . he simultaneously gave orders in secret to the military and the Tonton Macoutes that returning deportees from the United States and other countries should always be arrested. Everyone who leaves Haiti illegally and then returns is put in jail. The order is still standing and has never been revoked.
1 1
Another former Tonton Macoute stated that "returnees received 'especially brutal treatment,' being constantly beaten about the head and kept tied up in jail cells." 12 Even the Haitian Government admits to the widespread denial of justice. In its preliminary observations on the April 1980 Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (IACHR), the Haitian Government explained: "Even though the law is still violated at every level, despite the improvements introduced over the last seven years, violations are most often due to the fact that this administration is overburdened, understaffed, or does not act unless pressure is applied."' 1 3
Conditions in Haiti may be summarized as follows: Poverty is extreme and pervasive; the Haitian Government does virtually nothing to improve the general welfare of the masses but rather exploits and exacerbates existing conditions; and repression is pervasive and triggered by the slightest imagined opposition.
IV HAITIANS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. The Constellation of Forces
The first Haitians to request political asylum did so in September 1963, after having been taken into custody by the INS upon their arrival in Florida.' '4 These claims, as well as almost all subsequent Haitian claims for political asylum, have been denied under both the asylum regulations and section 243(h). Members of south Florida's political elite-including Democratic party members, elected officials, and some Cubans-believed that the boat people were a disruptive force, destroying the community and draining public resources. They appealed to their local Congressmen, who apparently pressured the INS into a response.' 1 7 The INS thereafter began to expend a far greater effort in controlling the flow of Haitians than was expended on nearly any other group of illegal immigrants. '" 8 While the government has been attempting to expel the Haitian boat people, nongovernmental groups at local and national levels, and groups within Congress, have been diligently working to obtain permanent legal status for the Haitians. In Miami the most visible supporters of the Haitians have been second-generation Cuban-Americans, the liberal branch of Florida's Democratic party, the established Haitian community, the churches, and the media. Organized support from Miami's blacks has been narrowly based, possibly due to a lack of political organization rather than a lack of sympathy." 1 9 At the national level, church groupsparticularly the National Council of Churches-were the first to become involved. They were followed by public interest lawyers, national black groups (particularly the Congressional Black Caucus), and other civil rights organizations, unions, and eventually state and local officials with a fiscal interest in legalizing the Haitians' status. 120
B. The Haitians and the Courts
After denial of refugee status by the INS, Haitians have repeatedly sought relief through the courts, with mixed results. The laws, regulations, and court decisions in previous Haitian and non-Haitian refugee cases have been sufficiently ambiguous and contradictory to provide the courts ample grounds to justify opposite findings in virtually identical cases.
In presenting their cases, the Haitians' lawyers have usually argued not that every Haitian deserves asylum, but that they do deserve a full and fair hearing. They claim that the INS has arbitrarily and capriciously dismissed their claims as frivolous. 121 When denying redress to Haitians, the courts have reiterated a number of arguments:
1. 5. Persecution must be politically motivated, as evidenced by the applicant's explicit opposition to the regime and participation in organized political activity. 128 6. Past persecution does not ipso facto demonstrate a likelihood of future persecution. 8. The courts will not be abused by allowing dilatory tactics to delay deportation or exclusion proceedings. 5. Persecution may occur in the absence of overt political action, and political conditions may be so oppressive that a wider range of claims, including deprivation of economic livelihood, must be given credence.
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' 6. A court may examine the conditions in the country from which the applicant has fled to determine whether a District Director's decision was arbitrary or capricious. Such an examination is not an infringement on the political prerogatives of the executive branch. 38 The split of judicial opinion is dramatically captured in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Paul v. INS 139 Petitioners asked the court to remand their asylum cases to the INS so that they might adduce specific additional evidence of persecution in Haiti. One petitioner had been imprisoned for twenty days; the brother of another was killed and relatives had to change their names and addresses; the father and mother of a third died in prison after being tortured; the police broke into the home of a fourth and told him that if he did not leave Haiti the police would kill him; another wrote a letter to Jean-Claude Duvalier and was arrested for plotting against the regime.
4°
These petitioners, as well as others not described here, wished to introduce new evidence.' 4 '
The majority found against the petitioners concluding, "We do not find the evidence which petitioners seek to adduce material."' ' 42 The majority further held that the petitioners had no valid excuse for not having offered the evidence earlier.
The court limited its review to judging whether the district director's use of authority was arbitrary and capricious and found the denials of asylum to be neither. Making the assumption that the evidence cited above was substantially In the face of this judicial ambivalence the INS continued to operate under the assumption that the boat people were not politically motivated but were arriving for purely economic reasons.
144 They attempted to discourage further migration by making it as difficult as possible for incoming Haitians to find work. Most Haitians were detained-in some cases as far away as El Paso, Texas-with bond set at a minimum of $500.145 Additionally, the INS denied work authorization to those who were released on bond.
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The INS policy, however, had no visible deterrent effect; rather, the number of boats arriving gradually increased.1 47 Soon southern Florida's prisons were overcrowded with Haitians living in conditions appalling even to the INS authorities responsible for placing them there.148 In 1977, events accelerated. Leonel Castillo was appointed INS Commissioner, the first ethnic minority person to hold that position. The Service's Haitian policy softened somewhat. The INS announced that it was on the verge of issuing new asylum regulations which would grant the Haitians the rights they were seeking through the courts.
14 9 Asylum regulations would be written in accordance with the 1967 UN Protocol and individuals in exclusion proceedings would receive the same rights as those in deportation proceedings. Moreover, the INS agreed to release Haitians without bond and to issue them work authorizations while their asylum hearings were pending.
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Although the agreement stipulated issuance of work authorizations only to Haitians who were "known," the INS publicly announced that any Haitian who presented himself to the INS would receive a work authorization. About 5,000 Haitians came forward and received work authorizations.' [Vol. The two principal thrusts of the program were to deny Haitians access to lawyers and to prejudge any Haitian claims for asylum. The INS would not only fail to advise Haitians of their right to a lawyer but would also tell arriving Haitians that an attorney would get them in trouble.1 55 To deter pro bono lawyers from informing Haitians of their rights to claim asylum and have a lawyer, INS posted a guard in its Miami offices. 156 Moreover, the documents of some Haitians who had requested lawyers were falsified to state that they had not requested lawyers. Hearings were speeded up, making it impossible for those Haitians who did have lawyers to prepare or present adequate asylum cases. The INS suspended one of its own regulations requiring that deportation hearings be halted for any individual who had filed a political asylum application. 58 Under the speedup program lawyers had only thirty minutes to prepare cases, though the normal preparation time for an asylum claim was twenty hours. 159 There was no time to collect either documents or witnesses. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), which sent representatives to Miami during the mass processing period, claimed that only 45% of all Haitian asylum applicants were even interviewed before their claims were denied by the INS.
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Before the speedup, the INS processed fewer than half a dozen Haitian asylum claims a day (indeed, they processed less than ten a day for all nationalities).
16 1 By July 1978, Haitian cases had climbed to fifty-five claims processed per day, and by September, more than one hundred. 162 The INS scheduled a dozen or more asylum interviews and deportation hearings for the same hour. Attorneys were frequently expected to appear in fifteen different cases and five different locations at the same time. An INS official testified that it would have been "too cumbersome" for the agency to have coordinated the scheduling of hearings to avoid time conflicts. 1 63 Proceedings, which formerly averaged ninety minutes, were shortened to less than half an hour.
6 4 When lawyers attempted to intercede on behalf of their clients, the immigration judges ordered them to remain silent. If the lawyers persisted, the judges threatened them with disciplinary proceedings.
16 5 On some occasions, Haitians angered the immigration judges by invoking their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination; these Haitians were thrown in jail.
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The INS later admitted it did not possess the authority to jail anyone for invoking the fifth amendment.
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For those immigrants who did attempt to plead their cases, much was lost in the translation. Detailed, extensive evidence of persecution in Haiti as a motivation for coming to the United States became after translation, "I came here to find work."' 168 At the conclusion of these abbreviated asylum hearings, forms representing denial of asylum claims were presented to the Haitians. The forms had been prepared in advance and presigned by the INS District Director.
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When the Haitian Program commenced, the government had not yet issued the new asylum regulations promised nearly a year earlier. In September 1978, Judge King of the southern district court of Florida, held a hearing to discern why the government had not yet issued the new regulations. 170 When he discovered that, in addition to having not yet issued new regulations, the INS had initiated a massive streamlined deportation process, the judge inveighed against the government attorney. The next day, the new regulations were issued.' 7 '
Haitian advocates quickly challenged the regulations, claiming that they violated the Administrative Procedure Act because they had not been preceded by notice and time for public comment and that they did not assure due process for asylum claims as originally promised.1
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In October 1978, Judge King continued a stay of exclusion proceedings pending revisions of the regulations. 173 In April 1979, the reissued regulations for asylum hearings appeared in the Federal Regitler. 174 Again, Haitian advocates challenged them, this time on the grounds that they would not sufficiently notify the Haitians of their rights. 175 While the defense employed all of the arguments previously successful in court cases which had dismissed Haitian asylum claims, it placed greatest emphasis upon the report of a State Department team of experts who had gone to Haiti in July 1979 to search for returnees.' 8 ' The team consisted of white, non-Creolespeaking State Department employees who searched for 700 or more Haitians who had been deported or voluntarily returned to Haiti. They found and interviewed eighty-six, none of whom, according to the report, acknowledged having been persecuted or otherwise mistreated.
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The plaintiffs countered this evidence with expert human rights testimony, including a presentation from Amnesty International. 8 3 This testimony asserted that the State Department's method was defective on several grounds: the sample was unrepresentative, the team made no effort to determine if any of the returnees might be in prison, and the respondents had little incentive to tell the truth concerning persecution and were offered little protection from future persecution if they did tell of persecution. In short, according to this testimony, the report proved nothing concerning the fate of returnees. To further refute the State Department report, the plaintiffs presented a witness who had previously worked for the Haitian Government and who claimed knowledge of and participation in Haitian government persecution of returnees.' 8 4 The defense had no countervailing witnesses, but questioned the credibility of this witness, who was himself claiming political asylum.
Judge King's opinion, issued on July 2, 1980, did not equivocate: "Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom and justice did not find it."185 Instead, "they were confronted with an Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport them irrespective of the merits of their asylum claims."' ' 86 The INS actions, however, were not a new phenomenon. "Over the past 17 years, Haitian claims for asylum and refuge have been systematically denied, while all others have been granted. The recent Haitian Program is but the largest-scale, most dramatic example of that pattern."'1 8 7 The Court dismissed the government's contention that nearly all Haitians in the United States were merely seeking better economic conditions and faced no threat of political persecution upon return. " [T] he Court has seen a stark picture of how these plaintiff-immigrants will be treated if they return to Haiti. And it has seen an equally stark, and even more troubling, picture of the treatment of the Haitians by the Immigration and Naturalization Service."' ' 88 In an unusually scathing judicial criticism of an executive agency, Judge King also suggested that officials of the service had been motivated, to some degree, by racial prejudice. "The plaintiffs are part of the first substantial flight of black refugees from a repressive regime to this country."'1 8 9 While admitting prejudice of any type is seldom overt, Judge King asserted he could place no other interpretation on some key pieces of evidence including an internal immigration service memorandum asserting that the Haitians threatened the economic and social "well-being" of Miami.
19'
The ruling strongly condemned both the United States and Haitian Governments and provided findings of fact which clearly suggested that the Haitians had a "well-founded fear of persecution." Nevertheless, the ruling stopped short of Cubans who were interviewed as they stepped ashore explained that they were coming to the United States because food was scarce in Cuba or they thought they could earn more in this country. 94 Most were soon claiming that they had fled the oppression of the Castro regime; the INS treated them as they had previous influxes of Cubans, that is, as refugees.' 95 The irony of rejecting Haitians who allegedly arrived for economic reasons, while accepting Cubans who initially asserted they came for economic reasons, was not lost on either the U.S. media or the public. The vacillations and chaos in the handling of the Cuban crisis by the Carter Administration received most of the media's attention, but local Miami and some national media noted the blatant inconsistencies between the treatment of the Cubans and Haitians. 96 Cubans were quickly processed and released, classified as asylum applicants, while the Haitians were still classified as being in exclusion proceedings. Some of the Cubans were given cash gifts by the U.S. authorities, while the Haitians were detained in jails.
7
Clearly, the U.S. Government could not at the same time welcome self-proclaimed economic refugees from Cuba while rejecting Haitians for allegedly being no more than economic refugees. Although some of the arriving Cubans are also black, such contradictory treatment would be indicative of racial and ideological bias.
Haitian advocates were quick to advance charges of discriminatory treatment. Marches were staged in Miami, New York, Washington, and other cities. Hunger strikes, letter-writing campaigns, and visits with members of Congress and highranking Carter Administration officials were conducted. 198 20 7 On at least one occasion the door to the hearing room was locked, and when an attorney from the Haitian Refugee Center sought entrance, he was informed that the judge did not want him in the courtroom.
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Between June 1 and June 5, 1981, exclusion hearings were conducted for 136 Haitians. Ninety-six were ordered excluded and deported; eleven were actually deported on June 4, and eighty-five were about to be deported on June 9, when a stay order was issued because of a suit filed by Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. The suit requested cancellation of the final deportation orders, claiming that the INS violated petitioners' rights to a "fair exclusionary hearing and to fair proceedings, and to consult with counsel. ' '210 The government contended that the Haitians had knowingly waived their rights to an attorney, had turned aside political asylum forms, and had indicated that they did not want an appeal. The administration's proposed legislation (1) bars applications by aliens who come into the United States in transit without visas or who enter without inspection, a qualification which applies perfectly to the boat people; (2) limits the participation of counsel during asylum interviews; (3) bars administrative appeals and review except for certification by the Commissioner or Attorney General; (4) bars motions to reopen except upon a clear showing of changed circumstances; and (5) allows judicial review of a denial only in the context of a review of a final order of deportation or exclusion.
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The Department of Justice requested these changes from Congress because, "[U]nder the present system, the appeal process is abused by applicants with frivolous claims. ' 254 Limiting participation of counsel would "prevent the asylum interview from deteriorating into an adversarial proceeding. ' 255 No independent judicial review of an asylum application would be allowed in order to "prevent abuse of the asylum process as a method of preventing deportation. ' 256 Final orders of exclusion or deportation would be subject to appeal under a writ of habeas corpus to the court of appeals. 25 7 Review, however, would be limited to the record developed during the exclusion or deportation hearing. 258 The act would, moreover, bar any review of an asylum claim during an exclusion or deportation hearing. 259 Thus, the record before the court of appeals would contain nothing to review concerning factual or discretionary decisions by asylum officers. The congressional legislation proposed by Simpson and Mazzoli would change principally three areas of asylum law by providing for: (1) a summary exclusion procedure for aliens who arrived without documentation; (2) the creation of special adjudication procedures for asylum claims; and (3) the reduction in scope of judicial review available for asylum decisions. 264 Under both bills, aliens would be summarily excluded by the INS if they did not present the documentation required for entry, had no legal basis for entry, and did not indicate an intention to apply for asylum. 26 5 The House version indicated that an alien would have to be informed of his right to have his case redetermined by an administrative law judge while the Senate version provided for no such review.
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The Senate and House versions of the bill each called for establishment of a system of administrative law judges for hearing asylum claims and a U.S. Immigration Board (USIB) for appeals of all final immigration determinations except summary exclusion procedures.
267
Under the Senate bill, the USIB and the administrative law judges would be appointed by the Attorney General, while in the House version the President would appoint the USIB and the chairman of the USIB would appoint the administrative law judges.
268
The Senate bill explicitly disallowed judicial review of asylum claims, although the constitutional right of habeas corpus remained. 269 The House version provided that deportation, exclusion, and asylum decisions, following review by the USIB, may be reviewed as a matter of right in a federal court of appeals.
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While the House Report stated that "administrative shortcomings, not judicial interference, has [sic] caused the enormous backlog in asylum cases," 2 7
' the House bill nevertheless provided that there is to be no judicial review of any aspect of the asylum process until a final order of exclusion or deportation is entered by the USIB. 272 The House Committee, moreover, authorized multiple party habeas The courts have been a principal battleground of the Haitian refugee dispute, but they have not resolved it. Rather, they have issued ambiguous and vacillating opinions. In May 1982, the Fifth Circuit modified and affirmed the Haitian Refugee Center decision.
2 75 The court found that aliens have a fragile, but protected, right to petition for asylum. 2 76 Under the Haitian Program, it "strained credulity to assert that these plaintiffs were given a hearing on their asylum claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ' 277 In short, the Haitians were entitled under the fifth amendment to more due process than they received.
7 8
At the same time, the circuit court found it unnecessary to rule on the appellees' contention that the Haitians were victims of unlawful discrimination on the basis of national origin. Moreover, the court noted that it did not approve of the sweeping conclusions of the district court. 279 Nevertheless, it agreed that the district court's admission of evidence on political conditions in Haiti was proper for corroborating claims that the accelerated hearings did not afford Haitians a fair opportunity to present all such evidence, but improper in implying that the Haitians' claims of fear of persecution were actually merited rather than just not frivolous.
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The issues presented by the Haitian refugee crises are not ones which will be settled easily or quickly. They strike at the heart of the inconsistency between U.S. asylum law and practice. (1) U.S. refugee and asylum policy is based on humanitarian and nondiscriminatory principles;
(2) In practice, it is used extensively as a tool of foreign policy to favor those migrants fleeing Communist regimes and against those fleeing rightist regimes; (3) The ideological position or world view of those who make the policy and those who implement it allows them to believe that they are fair and nondiscriminatory in such behavior, since their reasoning is that totalitarian regimes are ipso facto repressive while authoritarian ones are far more selectively repressive.
In the specific case of the Haitians, the evidence indicates that many of the Haitians are fleeing a persecution which results from a regime best described as "lawless" and a "kleptocracy." Either the former Haitian officials are lying about the Haitian Government's policies of persecuting returnees, or boat people are ipso facto "refugees," regardless of their motivations for leaving.
Although the courts have not always supported the contentions of the Haitians seeking asylum in the United States, they have frequently noted the discrepancy between principle and practice. The independent power of the courts has made it virtually impossible to deport the Haitian boat people back to Haiti for the past four years. The administration continues to appeal their court losses. Most recently, the Reagan Adminsitration and the Chairmen of the Senate and House Immigration Subcommittees have proposed changing the laws. To resolve the battle, the administration must either convince the courts that those fleeing rightist persecution and corruption do not have a "well-founded fear of persecution," change asylum law to reflect foreign policy goals, or change foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, southern Florida is left to struggle with a potentially explosive problem.
The number of Haitians is minuscule compared to the number of Indochinese throughout the country, or even the number of Cubans in Miami, but the Haitian case is a test case of U.S. asylum policy. Will foreign policy and covert racist concerns continue to predominate U.S. asylum policy, or will broad humanitarian concerns overcome the recent historical tradition? Undoubtedly, the question will not easily be resolved.
